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Thailand’s 2019 Vote: The 
General’s Election
Jacob I. Ricks
Abstract
Thailand’s March 2019 ballot was the first for the country since 2011, and 
for many it signaled the potential end of the military junta’s five-year rule. 
But was it truly a return to democracy? This essay argues that the election 
was far from a democratization event. Instead, it was a highly orchestrated 
exercise to ensure authoritarian longevity. The junta employed techniques 
of institutional engineering as well as managing the election’s outcomes in 
an effort to extend the premiership of Prayuth Chan-ocha despite increasing 
pressure for a return to civilian rule. The results of the election suggest that 
Thai society continues to exhibit deep divisions between those who support 
and those who oppose military interventions in politics. I further contend 
that the election should be seen as part of the continuing struggle by 
conservative forces in society to maintain their dominance in politics despite 
demands from other segments of the population for equal representation, 
a contest which is far from over.
Keywords: Thailand, Thailand party system, elections, military junta, 
democracy, constitutional engineering
DOI: 10.5509/2019923443
After seizing power on May 22, 2014, General Prayuth Chan-ocha promised elections the following year, describing his coup as a temporary solution to achieve peace and correct flaws in the 
democratic system. He assured Thais that “genuine democracy (prachathipatai 
thi sombun)” would arrive shortly. Elections failed to occur, though, and it 
became clear that the military junta, using the moniker of National Council 
for Peace and Order (NCPO), had settled in for the long haul.1 Prayuth 
announced, and postponed, at least five election dates over the next four 
years.
____________________
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where he studies politics in Southeast Asia, with special emphasis on Thailand. He publishes on the 
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Consequently, anticipation ran high when the NCPO finally loosened 
restrictions on political activity on December 11, 2018 and determined March 
24, 2019 as the date of the long-awaited poll. Would this election return 
democracy to Thai soil? Although the campaign saw a relaxation of the 
stringent political and social controls exerted on the country during military 
rule, the junta was never committed to returning to a representative 
democracy. When official results were finally announced almost six weeks 
after the vote, it became clear that the outcome, a government headed by 
General Prayuth as prime minister, was according to design. The election 
was less a step toward democracy and more a tool to ensure authoritarian 
longevity.
Non-democratic regimes around the world frequently avail themselves of 
such institutional techniques to preserve their rule.2 Seemingly democratic 
institutions, like elections, can provide multiple benefits to dictators, allowing 
them to gauge public support, co-opt potential opponents, as well as facilitate 
power-sharing among political elites.3 In this essay, I treat the 2019 Thai 
election as an authoritarian survival mechanism. Rather than a return to 
democracy, I contend that the election was designed and orchestrated to 
allow Prayuth and his allies to continue their rule through the foreseeable 
future. I do this by highlighting the junta’s efforts to manage the election 
by engaging in constitutional engineering and shaping electoral outcomes 
before I turn to a discussion of the electoral results. The essay’s conclusion 
suggests that Thailand’s 2019 polls should be understood as part of an 
ongoing effort by conservative forces to resist growing demands from 
alternative societal groups for political representation.4
Managing the Election
Among authoritarian regimes, military juntas are particularly short-lived.5 
Coup leaders world over struggle to prolong their rule due to threats from 
alternate elites, the specter of opposition factions within their own military 
who might displace them, as well as demands from the population. The safest 
option is to transition from direct military rule to a system of power-sharing 
among elites, a process that is most effective when accompanied by the 
creation of an institutionalized political party.6 Indeed, authoritarian regimes 
____________________
2 Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
xix-xxi; Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 116–117.
3 Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, “Elections under authoritarianism,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 12 (2009): 405–406.
4 Kevin Hewison, “Thailand: Contestation over elections, sovereignty, and representation.” 
Representation 51, no. 1 (2015): 51–62.
5 Barbara Geddes, “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?” Annual Review 
of Political Science 2 (1999): 133.
6  Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, How Dictatorships Work (Cambridge University 
Press, 2018): 196–201.
445
Thailand's 2019 Vote
that at least partially rely on nominally democratic institutions and political 
parties for support are among the longest-lasting and most stable, seen in 
Southeast Asian examples like Singapore (1965–present), Malaysia (1957–
2018), and Suharto’s Indonesia (1967–1998).7
Thailand’s NCPO experienced increasing pressure during its five years 
in office, arising from a sluggish economy, the rise of potentially dangerous 
military factions, accusations of corruption, and demands for the long-awaited 
election.8 As threats grew, Prayuth could not rely on direct military rule 
indefinitely. To transition to an alternative arrangement while still holding 
the reins of power, however, posed a monumental challenge due to the 
continued popularity of the Pheu Thai political party, which the military had 
deposed. Pheu Thai, the third incarnation of former Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT), had won an outright majority of 
parliamentary seats in the 2011 election, and its previous manifestation, the 
People’s Power Party (PPP), had come close to the feat in 2007. Indeed, 
Thaksin-affiliated parties had won the most seats in every electoral contest 
since 2001 and were likely to do so again when the junta allowed elections. 
Thus, for Prayuth’s regime to transition from military dictatorship to an 
alternative ruling arrangement, the junta and their supporters would need 
to nullify Pheu Thai’s electoral capacity. The NCPO also desired that its 
chosen vessel, the newly-formed Phalang Pracharat Party (PPRP) should 
receive sufficient backing to consolidate rule in parliament. The junta and 
its allies aimed to do this via two mechanisms: (1) Crafting a new constitution, 
and (2) Influencing electoral outcomes to reflect junta preferences.
Constitutional Engineering
Re-writing constitutional rules to shape electoral outcomes has a long history 
in Thailand;9 the 1978 Constitution, a product of military intervention, 
restructured the party system and implemented block vote electoral rules.10 
Block voting caused electoral candidates to compete within multiple-seat 
districts, effectively pitting internal factions of political parties against one 
____________________
7  See Netina Tan, “Manipulating electoral laws in Singapore,” Electoral Studies 32 (2013): 
632–643; Kai Ostwald, “How to win a lost election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s 2013 General 
Election,” The Round Table 102, no 6 (2013): 521–532; Dwight King, Half-hearted Reform: Electoral 
Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), chapter 
2.
8  Paul Chambers, “What if Thailand’s Junta can’t control the Military?” New Mandala (blog), 
14 March 2019, https://tinyurl.com/y6ng84gg; Joshua Kurlantzick, “Thailand’s junta faces mounting 
pressure,” Asia Unbound (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, 12 February 2018, https://tinyurl.
com/y3bacfkz.
9  Bjorn Dressel, “Thailand’s Elusive Quest for a Workable Constitution, 1997–2007,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 31, no. 2 (2009): 300–307.
10  James Ockey, “Variations on a theme: Societal cleavages and party orientation through multiple 
transitions in Thailand,” Party Politics, 11, no. 6 (2005): 737–740.
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another, which encouraged weak multi-party coalition governments filled 
with fragmented and factionalized political parties.11 The 1997 Constitution, 
written independent of the military, replaced block voting with a mixed 
electoral system, in which voters cast two ballots: one single-member district 
vote and one national party-list vote. These reforms were designed to 
strengthen political parties and stabilize the party system, which they did, 
reducing both the number of political parties as well as the impact of party 
factions.12 This contributed to the ability of Thaksin Shinawatra and his TRT 
party to control parliament and enjoy a full four-year term as an elected 
prime minister, a first in Thai history. Thaksin’s prowess, though, upset 
traditional power holders, including the military and its allies, and after 
being re-elected with an absolute majority of parliamentary seats in 2005, 
Thaksin’s second term was cut short by a coup in 2006. The military abolished 
the 1997 Constitution and appointed a government tasked with crafting a 
new constitution designed to block Thaksin’s ability to return to power. The 
2007 Constitution re-instated the pre-1997 block vote system combined with 
a region-based party-list in hopes of filling parliament with multiple relatively 
weak political parties. The Thai electorate, though, demonstrated strong 
party identification in the 2007 election, returning a bifurcated parliament 
split between the TRT’s successor, the PPP, and the opposition Democrat 
Party.13 Conservative forces, acting through the judiciary, disqualified two 
PPP premiers and dissolved the party before propping up a Democrat Party 
government in its place.14 In 2011, the Democrat-led government amended 
the 2007 Constitution to return to electoral rules similar to those in the 1997 
Constitution, which facilitated the ability of two large parties to dominate 
the 2011 election, wherein Pheu Thai won over half of parliamentary seats 
while the Democrats captured approximately one-third.
Thus Thailand's party system, shaped by electoral rules, had transitioned 
from a history of weak, multi-party governments to one overshadowed by 
two large parties. The 2014 coup leaders, however, were determined to 
succeed where the 2007 Constitution had failed. They hoped to see a 
parliament filled with smaller parties15 and weakened coalitions, which would 
____________________
11  Joel Sawat Selway, Coalitions of the Well-being (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
95–99.
12  Allen Hicken, Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 127–133, 136–139.
13  Allen Hicken and Joel Sawat Selway, “Forcing the genie back in the bottle: Sociological change, 
institutional reform, and health policy in Thailand,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 12 (2012): 69–77.
14  Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat, “The resilience of monarchised military in Thailand,” 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 46, no. 3 (2016): 433–434; Eugenie Merieau, “Thailand’s deep state, royal 
power, and the Constitutional Court (1997–2015),” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46, no. 3 (2016): 
458–459.
15  Punchada Sirivunnabood, “Thailand’s puzzling 2019 election: How the NCPO junta has 
embedded itself in Thai politics,” ISEAS perspective, no. 44 (2019): 3–5.
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allow unelected officials greater sway in governing the country.16 As such, 
the junta deliberately appointed a set of constitutional drafters, headed by 
the conservative septuagenarian Meechai Ruchuphan, to ensure that the 
charter reflected junta preferences.
The resultant 2017 Constitution, the junta’s second attempt at 
constitutional engineering after the aborted 2015 draft, introduced a new 
electoral system as well as a powerful appointed senate, both of which were 
institutions designed to maintain the junta’s control over politics. The new 
electoral system, called Mixed Member Apportionment, divides parliament 
into 350 single-member districts based on majoritarian rules as well as 150 
party-list seats appointed through proportional representation at the national 
level. Each citizen’s single vote on a fused ballot counts toward their district 
seat as well as contributes to the representative’s party in the national tally, 
preventing voters from splitting their ballots between a favorite local political 
figure and their preferred party. All votes are counted at the national level 
to determine the total number of parliamentary seats that any party should 
obtain based on the total proportion of the national vote received. The 
party-list seat allocation is then calculated using this number, taking into 
account the district-based seats the party won. Thus parties that perform well 
in constituency seats would not necessarily receive any party-list seats. For 
example, a hypothetical party that won 20 percent of the vote nation-wide 
would be allocated the rights to 20 percent of the 500 seats in parliament, 
or 100 seats in total. The party’s constituency seats would then be subtracted 
from that number to arrive at the number of party-list seats the party should 
be allocated. If the party had won 100 or more district seats, it would therefore 
receive no party-list seats. If, however, it had received fewer than its allocation, 
then the Election Commission would use a formula to determine how many 
party-list seats the party would receive. The system was thus devised to boost 
parties that failed to win constituency seats but still garnered votes nation-
wide while reducing the impact of parties that performed well in district-based 
contests.
Pheu Thai Party claimed that the new scheme was designed to disadvantage 
them and push Thailand toward a system of small, factional parties and weak 
coalition governments as existed prior to 2001, which would benefit the 
pro-junta PPRP.17 The constitutional drafters disputed this interpretation,18 
but the data supported Pheu Thai’s claims. Allen Hicken and Bangkok Pundit 
____________________
16  Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, “A year after referendum, only bad news about Thailand’s 
Constitution,” New Mandala (blog), 29 August 2017, https://tinyurl.com/y6kxozj2; Jacob Ricks, 
“Agents, Principals, or Something in Between? Bureaucrats and Policy Control in Thailand,” Journal 
of East Asian Studies 18 (2018): 337.
17  See Duncan McCargo, “Thailand’s changing party landscape,” ISEAS Perspectives, no. 63 (2018): 
2–3.
18  Khanittha Thepphajorn, “New voting system good for parties,” The Nation, 7 November 2015. 
See also Punchada, “Thailand’s,” 5.
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demonstrated the impact of the 2017 electoral rules by applying them to the 
2011 election returns, showing that they benefit medium-sized parties while 
punishing larger parties, especially Pheu Thai, which would have lost 40 
parliamentary seats had the new rules been applied to the 2011 results.19 
Medium-sized parties would be the main beneficiaries, including new parties 
like PPRP. Indeed, while speaking to the PPRP, Somsak Thepsuthin, a pro-
junta leader, blatantly stated, “This constitution was designed for us.”20
Furthermore, the constitution and ensuing legislation provided vague 
advice on the actual calculation of party-list seat allocations, granting the 
junta-appointed Election Commission (EC) discretion in determining how 
national results would translate into party-list seats. During the weeks 
following the election, voters were left in the lurch as the EC waffled between 
different calculations, eventually deciding to reduce the minimum threshold 
for a parliamentary seat from approximately 71,000 votes to just over 35,000 
votes (approximately 0.10 percent of the total vote), paving the way for a 
record 26 parties in parliament21 despite questions about the formula’s 
constitutionality.22
This decision served as a fatal blow to Pheu Thai’s hopes to form a 
government. On March 27, seven parties led by Pheu Thai announced their 
intention to form a coalition government, expecting to gain over 250 
parliamentary seats based on a party-list threshold of 71,000 votes. The change 
in the party-list seat calculation, though, decreased their seat count to no 
more than 246 by reallocating seats from anti-junta coalition parties to 10 
minor parties, all of which declared themselves as Prayuth supporters. The 
EC’s decision was seen by many as a last-ditch effort to use electoral rules to 
eviscerate Pheu Thai’s chances at filling the Prime Minister’s office.23 The 
electoral system was thus designed and implemented specifically to hinder 
the ability of Pheu Thai to gain a majority in parliament.
Additionally, the constitution empowered the appointed senate. The 
charter outlined a series of temporary transitional provisions, including the 
establishment of a 250-member appointed senate, which would share 
responsibility for choosing prime ministers during the senate’s initial five-year 
term. As the House of Representatives’ tenure is no longer than four years, 
the junta-chosen senate will take part in picking the prime minister at least 
____________________
19  Allen Hicken and Bangkok Pundit, “The effects of Thailand’s proposed electoral system,” 
Thai Data Points (blog), 10 February 2016, https://tinyurl.com/y2zefl47.
20  Teeranai Charuvastra, “‘Three friends’ join pro-junta party, say charter favors them,” Khaosod 
English, 19 November 2018.
21  Initially 27 parties were seated before a by-election in Chiang Mai caused a revision in 
calculations.
22  Mongkol Bangprapa and Aekarach Sattaburuth, “EC to push ahead with formula,” Bangkok 
Post, 26 April 2019. The Constitutional Court refused to make a ruling on the formula for seat allocation, 
leaving the decision to the EC.
23  Aekarach Sattaburuth and Mongkol Bangprapa, “Pheu Thai govt hope on ropes,” Bangkok 
Post, 9 May 2019. See also Bangkok Post, “EC seat move is hijacking,” 10 May 2019.
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twice. Its role means that a winning prime ministerial candidate needs at least 
376 out of 750 votes from the combined houses rather than only a majority 
of 251 out of 500 votes from the lower house. Most observers presumed that 
the 250 senators would support Prayuth, meaning he would only need support 
from 126 elected parliamentarians to become prime minister. Beyond this 
responsibility, the first senate is also given special charge to oversee 
parliamentary behaviour, laws, and to pursue the junta’s reform agenda.
Senators were chosen under the direction of retired General Prawit 
Wongsuwan, who served as both deputy prime minister and deputy chief of 
the NCPO; shortly before the election, he spoke to the media expressing 
confidence that the junta could control (khum) the senate.24 The selection 
process was secretive, and many of the senators were drawn from retired 
members of the military, with at least 105 holding military or police rank. 
Six seats were reserved for head of the defence ministry, the military supreme 
commander, and the chiefs of the army, navy, air force, and police. The 
senate, then, provides the military junta a clear opportunity to regulate the 
political process even after the election. Combined with the electoral system 
designed to fragment the power of the Pheu Thai party, the constitution 
provided ample opportunity to avoid a truly democratic transition.
Shaping Outcomes
Political parties adapted to the changed electoral rules. This was most obvious 
in the anti-junta camp, dominated by the Pheu Thai and Future Forward 
parties, who campaigned vigorously against the junta throughout the election. 
Pheu Thai remained popular among voters in the north and northeast, but 
party leaders knew that electoral rules were stacked against them. They 
decided to split the party, spawning the Thai Raksa Chart (TRC) party to 
increase their chances of scoring party-list seats.25 Pheu Thai would campaign 
in most constituencies, especially among districts where it was strongest, but 
it ceded 100 constituencies where it had not performed as well in 2011 to 
the TRC, which housed some of Pheu Thai’s well-known leaders, such as 
Preechapol Pongpanich and Chaturon Chaisang. By picking up votes in 
these districts while not winning as many district seats, the TRC would thus 
have a better chance at qualifying for party-list seats without being penalized 
for the constituency seats won by Pheu Thai. The two parties hoped that by 
coordinating campaigns, they would be able to overcome the institutional 
hurdles in the new constitution.
____________________
24  Post Today, “‘Muea rao tang ma laeo ko tong khum hai dai’ Bik Bom manchai khum SW. dai 
[‘When we have appointed them we must be able to control them’ Big Bom confident he can control 
the senate],” 13 March 2019.
25  Two additional smaller parties, Pheu Chart and Pheu Tham, were linked to Pheu Thai. These 
parties also served as a safety mechanism in case the government or courts dissolved Pheu Thai as 
happened to PPP in 2008. Teeranai Charuvastra, “Pheu Thai readies backup party in case it’s dissolved,” 
Khao Sod English, 27 September 2018.
Pacific Affairs: Volume 92, No. 3 – September 2019
450
More surprising for the junta was the rapid growth and popularity of the 
staunchly anti-junta Future Forward party (FFP), whose strategy focused on 
obtaining party-list seats. Headed by the auto-parts scion Thanathorn 
Juangroongruangkit, it espoused liberal democratic ideas with a special 
emphasis on opposing military rule. The party became particularly popular 
among younger Thais, and its social media presence quickly eclipsed most 
other parties, allowing it to capture a great deal of anti-junta feeling as well 
as antipathy toward traditional clientelistic politics despite limited political 
networks.26
While the junta found a few friends among the new political parties, such 
as Suthep Thaugsuban’s Action Coalition for Thailand, these were relatively 
small in number. Many alternative political parties adopted a wait-and-see 
approach, refusing to openly declare themselves pro- or anti-junta until after 
the election in order to maximize their bargaining power during cabinet 
formation. These included regionally-based Bhumjai Thai and 
Chartthaipattana. The Democrat party, traditionally conservative and more 
than willing to work with military governments in the past, had both pro-
Prayuth and anti-Prayuth factions, but its leader, Abhisit Vejjajjiva, indicated 
that the party would neither support a Prayuth government nor would it join 
an alliance with Pheu Thai. However he left the door open to joining a 
coalition with PPRP.27 Thus, a significant block of parties were noncommittal 
about how they would behave after the election; if PPRP did well, it could 
expect their support, but if the tides were against it, it would likely struggle 
to build a coalition.
With few parties explicitly on their side and the opposition adapting to 
their institutional engineering, the junta and its allies felt the need to ensure 
that the PPRP would receive sufficient parliamentary support to retain 
Prayuth as prime minister.28 In 2017, Prayuth began a series of mobile cabinet 
meetings that bore eerie resemblance to political rallies. During these 
meetings, which occurred at least monthly, Prayuth traveled to locations 
around the country and staged gatherings with local leaders as well as the 
public. The general would observe development projects and speak to people 
about his government’s policy efforts in the area, frequently engaging in 
public relations antics and photo opportunities, such as riding on tractors, 
taking part in the rice harvest, or talking to farm animals. Opposition 
politicians complained that these mobile cabinet meetings served the same 
purpose as campaigning and thus granted the general an unfair advantage, 
especially since political parties were under a strict prohibition against 
____________________
26  Aim Sinpeng, “Campaigning without vote canvassers,” Thai Data Points (blog), 19 June 2019, 
https://tinyurl.com/yycb8mjw.
27  Teeranai Charuvastra, “Abhisit rules out voting for Prayuth,” Khao Sod English, 11 March 2019.
28  Thaikanot Trisuwan, “Luak tang 2562: chak “phaendinwaikanmuang” thung 
“ratprahangprasatsai” [2019 Election: From “political earthquake” to “sand castle coup”], BBC Thai, 
6 March 2019.
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politicking. Even the junta’s sympathizers, like the Thai Post, struggled to 
make the distinction between Prayuth’s behaviour and campaigning; on 
August 16, 2018, four months before campaigning was allowed, the paper 
ran a headline declaring, “Prayuth Campaigns in the Capital (Prayuth Hasiang 
Mueangkrung).” The EC vindicated the government, arguing that the mobile 
cabinet meetings were part of Prayuth’s administrative duties as prime 
minister and thus were justified.
Beyond Prayuth, supporters of the PPRP were allowed to engage in de 
facto political activities in the months prior to the end of the ban on political 
activities. The “Three Friends (sammit)” group, a set of core junta supporters, 
maintained themselves independent from the PPRP until November 2018, 
despite obviously acting to support the PPRP and the junta. Throughout 
2018, the group visited many Pheu Thai politicians encouraging them to 
abandon the party and run on the PPRP ticket. They also conducted what 
many construed to be campaign activities, which the junta sanctioned, 
explaining that the Three Friends were not members of a political party.29 
In other words, Prayuth and his supporters were actively courting voters long 
before the junta’s ban on political activity was lifted, giving them a strong 
head start in the campaign.
Another important factor shaping outcomes was the behaviour of the EC, 
whose members were appointed to seven-year terms by the junta in 2018. 
The commission has been accused of both political bias as well as 
incompetence in handling the election, including complaints over 
inconsistent announcements about results, repeated delays, poll 
manipulation, and potentially miscounting ballots.30 Beyond its decision 
regarding party-list seat allocation discussed above, the EC took actions that 
further disadvantaged the anti-junta camp, such as disqualifying a winning 
Pheu Thai candidate for vote-buying after he donated 2,000 baht (63 USD) 
to a monk during the campaign, even though monks are not allowed to 
vote.31 Additionally, the commission successfully sought to block FFP’s 
Thanathorn from being seated in parliament over concerns he had not 
divested his ownership of media shares in sufficient time before the election.32
More damaging to the anti-junta coalition was the EC’s decision to seek 
the dissolution of the Thai Raksa Chart (TRC) party. When the TRC 
nominated Princess Ubolratana Rajakanya as their sole prime ministerial 
candidate on February 8, it set off a political earthquake. For many, the TRC’s 
____________________
29 Teeranai Charuvastra, “Pro-Junta politicians can campaign because they are not politicians: 
Junta,” Khaosod English, 14 August 2018.
30  Bangkok Post, “Petition to impeach EC hits 660,000 names,” 26 March 2019; Jintamas 
Saksornchai, “Poll observers not confident election free or fair,” Khaosod English, 24 March 2019.
31  Jintamas Saksornchai, “By-election ordered in Chiang Mai as Pheu Thai winner disqualified,” 
Khaosod English, 24 April 2019.
32  Teeranai Charuvastra, “Court accepts case against Thanathorn, suspends MP status,” Khaosod 
English, 23 May 2019.
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actions signaled a move by the absent Thaksin to circumvent restrictions 
placed on politicians in the new constitution, as both law and custom prevent 
criticism of a royal, even one that had forsaken her title over 40 years prior. 
The attempt backfired, and that evening King Vajiralongkorn issued a public 
statement that Princess Ubolratana’s nomination was inappropriate. All 
actors involved quickly aligned themselves with the king’s statement, and 
the TRC withdrew their nomination. With unusual speed, and without 
providing the party an opportunity to defend itself, the EC recommend that 
the Constitutional Court disband the TRC. The court obliged, leaving 100 
constituencies without a Pheu Thai-allied candidate, severely damaging the 
party’s electoral strategy.
Finally, the military remained an important force throughout the run-up 
to the election. At the outset of his role as military dictator, Prayuth wore 
three hats: prime minister, head of the NCPO, as well as Commander in 
Chief of the Royal Thai Army. He stepped down as army chief during the 
annual reshuffle in October 2014, appointing a successor from his military 
faction to support him.33 Since that time, he has retained both the prime 
minister’s seat as well as his place as head of the NCPO. Even though he 
publicly declared himself no longer a soldier,34 Prayuth continued to rely on 
the armed forces for political backing. The NCPO was staffed primarily by 
military officials and retired generals, notably two former army chiefs, General 
Prawit Wongsuwan and General Anupong Paochinda, who maintain strong 
ties throughout the armed forces. The fate of the NCPO and Prayuth have 
been intimately tied to the military, which remains one of the most important 
political actors in Thai politics.
The military’s strength in politics is based in both the willingness of the 
top brass to engage in politics35 as well as the army’s maintenance of a power 
structure independent of control by politicians.36 This degree of military 
independence from civilian control allows for active military officials to make 
public their disdain for politicians as well as act in ways that might potentially 
influence electoral behaviour. The current army chief General Apirat 
Kongsompong, himself the son of a coup-maker, made very public statements 
criticizing policy platforms floated by Pheu Thai and the FFP proposing cuts 
to military budgets and an end to conscription. Apirat further stirred 
controversy in the campaign by suggesting politicians and civilians should 
revive the nationalist and anti-communist song “nak phaendin (scum of the 
earth)” in opposition to the policy proposals; the song has long been 
____________________
33 Prayuth’s faction dominated held the army chief position until late 2016. See Chambers, “What 
if.”
34 Mongkol Bangprapa, “Prayuth ‘no longer a soldier,’” Bangkok Post, 4 January 2018.
35 Punchada Sirivunnabood and Jacob Ricks, “Professionals and soldiers: Measuring 
professionalism in the Thai military,” Pacific Affairs 89, no. 1 (2016): 23–24, 26–28.
36 Chambers and Napisa “The resilience,” 426–430; Ricks, “Agents, principals,” 334–336.
453
Thailand's 2019 Vote
recognized as a propaganda tool to dehumanize opponents of the military.37 
A few weeks later, Apirat led a publicized ceremony wherein almost 800 
military officers pledged themselves to the institution of the monarchy, 
suggesting that the military would remain independent from civilian control. 
After the pledge, the army chief passed a certificate of appreciation to a 
soldier who had been chastised by an anti-military politician for shadowing 
him during electioneering.38 Apirat also filed a defamation charge against 
the politician. Multiple politicians further complained that soldiers had 
raided their homes during the campaign.39
The military’s behaviour fueled speculation that it would not accept a loss 
for the PPRP at the polls. A candidate for the pro-military Action Coalition 
of Thailand party publicly stated via Facebook only four days before the 
election that if the anti-military parties were successful during the vote, another 
coup would follow.40 Combined with the actions of the generals, such 
statements appear credible, and General Apirat, who will be in his position 
until retirement in late 2020, has refused to rule out staging another coup.41
In sum, the military junta rewrote Thailand’s electoral system to 
disadvantage the Pheu Thai party and favor Prayuth’s return as prime 
minister. The junta also included the insurance mechanism of an appointed 
senate to guarantee that elected politicians would be unable to form a 
government without extensive oversight. Not trusting the institutions alone, 
Prayuth and his supporters spent at least a year before the ballot drumming 
up electoral support. The junta-appointed EC additionally made multiple 
decisions that constrained the prospects of anti-junta parties. Furthermore, 
the military expressed its support for the junta repeatedly, raising the specter 
of another coup before voters. Despite the open space for political 
competition relative to the previous four years, the outcome of the election 
was prescribed by the regime and was designed to facilitate a transition from 
direct military rule to a government headed by Prayuth and supported by 
the PPRP.
____________________
37 Wassana Nanuam and Aekarach Sattaburuth, “Apirat attacks Pheu Thai’s call to cut defense 
budget,” Bangkok Post, 19 February 2019; See Thongchai Winichakul, “Remembering/Silencing the 
traumatic past,” in Cultural Crisis and Social Memory: Modernity and Identity in Thailand and Laos, eds. 
Charles F. Keyes and Shigeharu Tanabe (New York: Routledge, 2002), 243–244.
38 Thai PBS, “Khrang raek! PB.TB. Nam 796 Naithahan Patiyan Pokpong Chat-Kiat Thahan,” 7 
March 2019.
39 Teeranai Charuvastra, “Army has sent soldiers to raid election candidate’s homes,” Khaosod 
English, 21 March 2019.
40 Teeranai Charuvastra, “Pro-junta politico says coup awaits opposition win,” Khaosod English, 
20 March 2019.
41 Pravit Rojanaphruk, “New army chief open to staging another coup,” Khaosod English, 18 
October 2018.
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Even with the advantages it had built into the constitution as well as the 
uneven campaign, the junta came dangerously close to losing the election. 
Without the EC’s last-minute recalculation of the party-list seats, the anti-
junta camp would have held over 250 seats in the legislature; not nearly 
enough to overcome the power of the senate’s votes, but sufficient to force 
Prayuth into a situation where he would have ruled via a minority coalition. 
Nevertheless, the general emerged victorious. Within a few weeks after results 
were finalized, the fence-sitting Bhumjai Thai, Chartthaipattana, and 
Democrat parties joined the PPRP-led coalition of 19 parties, and Prayuth 
was appointed prime minister on June 11. While the outcome was as expected, 
electoral results in table 1 provide additional insights on the Thai electorate.
First, the PPRP did much better with voters than most observers had 
predicted; the party won over 8 million votes, making it the largest vote-getter 
in the contest. Its declared allies, however, did quite poorly, with the largest 
alternate pro-junta party (Action Coalition for Thailand) winning barely 
over 1 percent of the vote. Even so, these results mean that approximately 
one-quarter of Thai voters chose parties whose explicit purpose was to retain 
the junta. While troubling for pro-democracy advocates, this is consistent 
with opinion surveys that find a significant minority of the Thai population 
is supportive of military rule.42 PPRP was able to capitalize on this segment 
of the population.
Second, as with every election since 2001, a Thaksin-linked party won the 
most parliamentary seats of any party. Due to the new electoral system, 
however, all of Pheu Thai’s seats came from single-member districts, meaning 
it failed to garner any party-list seats, which precluded its prime ministerial 
candidates, Sudarat Keyuraphan and Chaikasem Nitisiri, from obtaining 
parliamentary seats.43 The party lost a significant number of votes compared 
to its 2011 showing, resulting in 129 fewer parliamentary seats. Some of this 
could be explained by the change in electoral rules as well as Pheu Thai’s 
arrangement ceding 100 constituencies to the disbanded TRC,44 but it also 
reflected the fact that five years of military rule and the self-imposed exiles 
of Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra left the party less influential than it once 
was. Even so, controlling 27 percent of parliamentary seats, despite the 
disadvantages the party faced, is a testament to its appeal to large swaths of 
the Thai population.
____________________
42  Jacob Ricks, “The PPRP’s shock victory: Public support for military governance in Thailand,” 
Thai Data Points (blog), 21 March 2019, https://tinyurl.com/y4xb7dly; See also Erik Martinez Kuhonta 
and Aim Sinpeng, “Democratic regression in Thailand: The ambivalent role of civil society and political 
institutions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 36, no. 3 (2014): 338–339.
43  A third candidate, Chatchart Sitthiphan, declined to run for a parliamentary seat. Candidates 
for the premiership did not need to be members of parliament, a provision presumably to make way 
for Prayuth.
44  Joel Selway and Allen Hicken, “The Thai Raksa Chart penalty,” Thai Data Points (blog), 29 
May 2019, https://tinyurl.com/y3oo7vuz.
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Table 1  
Thailand’s 2019 electoral results and parliamentary seat counts 
Political Party Total Vote Count
Vote 
share
District 
Seats
Party-List 
Seats
Total Seat 
Count
Phalang Pracharat 8,441,274 23.74 97 19 116
Pheu Thai* 7,881,006 22.16 136 - 136
Future Forward* 6,330,619 17.80 31 50 81
Democrat 3,959,358 11.13 33 20 53
Bhumjai Thai 3,734,459 10.50 39 12 51
Seri Ruam Thai* 824,284 2.32 - 10 10
Chartthaipattana 783,689 2.20 6 4 10
New Economics* 486,273 1.37 - 6 6
Prachachart * 481,490 1.35 6 1 7
Pheu Chart* 421,412 1.19 - 5 5
Action Coalition for 
Thailand 415,585 1.17 1 4 5
Chart Pattana 244,990 0.69 1 2 3
Phalang Thongthin Thai 214,189 0.60 - 3 3
Forest Conservation Party 134,816 0.38 - 2 2
Thai People Power Party* 80,186 0.23 - 1 1
Thai Nation Power Party 73,421 0.21 - 1 1
Pracha Piwat 69,431 0.19 - 1 1
Phalang Thai Rak Thai 60,434 0.17 - 1 1
Thai Civilization 60,354 0.17 - 1 1
Thai Teachers for People 56,633 0.16 - 1 1
Pracha Niyom 56,264 0.16 - 1 1
Prachatham Thai 48,037 0.14 - 1 1
People Reform 45,420 0.13 - 1 1
Thai Citizen Party 44,961 0.13 - 1 1
New Democracy 39,260 0.11 - 1 1
New Palang Dharma 35,099 0.10 - 1 1
Total 35,561,556 350 150 500
 
Note: Parties in the anti-junta opposition are marked with an asterisk;  
         the remaining 19 parties joined the PPRP coalition.  
Source: Election Commission of Thailand. 
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Third, the FFP outpaced expectations, winning over 6 million votes and 
becoming the third-largest party in parliament. Pheu Thai’s misfortunes 
likely helped boost the FFP’s results. Some of its constituency wins came in 
locations where the TRC’s dissolution shifted anti-junta votes to the FFP, but 
the FFP also captured a groundswell of disaffection with Prayuth and the 
status quo. Conservative forces quickly targeted the FFP as dangerous, piling 
multiple court cases up against party members,45 including the accusation 
that led to Thanathorn being disqualified from sitting in parliament.46 
Nevertheless, the party’s strong showing is one of the election’s major success 
stories.
Finally, the Democrat party became the election’s biggest loser. Despite 
the party’s history of close ties with the military, Abhisit Vejjajjiva had tried 
to steer the Democrats away from the PPRP, and in the final days of the 
election declared himself opposed to Prayuth’s continued role as prime 
minister.47 Abhisit was unable, though, to completely turn to the anti-junta 
camp, as many Democrats favoured military intervention and any alliance 
with Pheu Thai was unacceptable to both sides. The party haemorrhaged 
voters, leaving it with one-third of its 2011 parliamentary seats. After the 
election, the heavily-diminished Democrats chose to join the pro-junta 
coalition, and Abhisit, who had survived as party leader despite losing 
elections in 2007 and 2011 and presiding over a bloody crackdown against 
protestors in 2010, resigned his position as party leader and his parliamentary 
seat in ignominious defeat.
In sum, the results show that the junta’s constitutional engineering 
combined with its five years in power has successfully diminished the two 
parties, Pheu Thai and Democrat, who had dominated parliament from 2001 
to 2014.48 At the same time, the election served as a referendum on the 
military’s rule, with the population sharply divided.49 On the one hand, the 
pro-military forces represent at least one-quarter of Thai voters; on the other, 
the anti-military camp obtained almost half of all votes. The remaining votes 
were claimed by regionally-based and opportunistic parties, who were poised 
to choose whichever side could grant them cabinet positions.
Conclusion
General Prayuth now heads a coalition of 19 political parties as he continues 
his role as Thailand’s leader. The junta’s constitutional engineering and 
____________________
45  Patpicah Tanakasempipat, “Thailand’s rising political star charged with sedition,” Reuters, 6 
April 2019; Kas Chanwanpen, “Another Future Forward MP comes under scrutiny,” The Nation, 11 
June 2019.
46  Bangkok Post, “Court suspends Thanathorn from MP,” 23 May 2019.
47  Teeranai, “Abhisit.”
48  By Pheu Thai I also mean its predecessors TRT (2001–2006) and PPP (2007–2008).
49  Prajak Kongkirati, “From illiberal democracy to military authoritarianism: Intra-elite struggle 
and mass-based conflict in deeply polarized Thailand,” Annals AAPSS, 681, no. 1 (2019): 33–37.
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efforts to shape the election were successful in achieving the immediate goal 
of retaining the prime minister’s office. Prayuth may even be able to claim 
some legitimacy in the fact that the PPRP received the largest vote share of 
any party, and the PPRP’s stronger-than-expected showing will likely 
embolden conservative forces. At the same time, it is certain Prayuth will 
encounter greater challenges than he faced as junta chief due to his 
fragmented coalition and strong parliamentary opposition. Indeed, in 
successfully sidelining Pheu Thai, the junta may have also designed a 
parliament that could quickly become unmanageable. The win could thus 
turn out to be ephemeral, requiring the regime to rely more heavily on the 
appointed senate or even the military for support.
With that in mind, it is important to remember that the election was not 
a democratization event, nor has it healed the deep divisions in Thai society. 
Instead, it was part of the continuing effort by conservative forces in Thailand 
to preserve their position at the top of a historical social hierarchy that has 
deep roots in the military rule of the 1950s to 1970s. Elements of a pyramidal 
social order have been embedded in a paternalistic ideal of “Thai-style 
democracy,” wherein certain segments of society, especially “good men (phu 
di or khon di)” who are often military officials or government bureaucrats, 
are believed to provide better governance and have more intrinsic rights to 
rule than elected politicians.50 This approach to politics continues to hold 
sway among conservative Thai elites, evidenced in the NCPO’s behaviour.51 
It also runs directly counter to tenets of representative democracy, which 
have presented a threat to advocates of Thai-style democracy since the brief 
democratic episode of 1973–1976. Indeed, the reaction by conservative forces 
to the FFP, pursuing multiple court cases against party leaders based on 
relatively minor infractions, is in response to this threat.
General Prayuth’s election was a victory for advocates of Thai-style 
democracy thanks to the junta’s ability to appoint their allies to important 
positions and their control over electoral rules. Even so, the contest over the 
foundations of Thai political society will continue, as the military and its 
allies struggle to maintain power in light of increasing pressure for equal 
representation from growing segments of the Thai population. The 2019 
election did little to resolve the conflict.
Singapore Management University, Singapore, June 2019
____________________
50  Kevin Hewison and Kengkij Kitirianglarp, “Thai-Style Democracy: The Royalist Struggle for 
Thailand’s Politics,” in Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand, eds. Soren Ivarsson 
and Lotte Isager (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), 186–189; Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The 
Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 98–109.
51  Hewison, “Contestation,” 57–60.
